A row of dominos falls. The amount of force applied to the first domino and the distance between each one provided the perfect conditions for the whole row to fall. If the dominos were set up in the same situation and we applied the same amount of force to the first one, the whole row would fall again.
Meanwhile, I order cheese curds at a restaurant. The amount of encouragement from my friends along with my love of grease and cheese provided the perfect conditions for the order. But if I were put in the same situation and applied the same amount of peer pressure and cheese-loving, would I order the curds again?
When the last domino in a row falls, it has no choice. Given the prior conditions, meaning the domino in front of it crashing into it, it must fall. And if it doesn’t fall, there will be an explanation which still lies in prior causes. Some examples could be insufficient force or too much distance between pieces.
It feels like I have more say in what I do than the domino. Obviously, the domino does not deliberate about whether it falls. And I do deliberate (though not carefully) about ordering cheese curds. But while it may feel like I can do something other than order cheese curds the moment I order them, whether this is true is a huge argument in philosophy with important implications.
Determinism
The argument at hand is centered around determinism. As far as philosophical concepts go, determinism is pretty simple. It means that when something occurs, it must occur given the past and the laws of nature. It gives a name to the fact that put in the same situation with the same laws of physics, a row of dominos that fell before will fall time and time again.
It’s rooted in what 17th century philosopher Gottfried Leibniz called the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The core of this principle is that if something happens, it can be explained. And if it can’t be explained, this means we lack information necessary for explaining it.
Understanding this principle, when the last piece in a row of dominos doesn’t fall, we don’t throw our hands in the air and say “Welp, there’s nothing you can do about that.” Instead, we look for possible reasons for why it didn’t fall.
Applied to science, determinism is very useful. After all, what else can explain an event other than its causes? If someone develops a disease, it’s best to see what caused the disease. When we know what’s caused a disease, we’re closer to treating it or preventing others from getting it. This logic applies to just about everything. Explaining events through causes helps us understand the world and make predictions.
But applied to human behavior, determinism may conflict with our idea of freedom. If all events can be explained by causes, and decisions are events (what else could they be?), does that mean all decisions are explainable by causes? If so, we may be left feeling that our decisions are simply a result of our past and that the possibility of doing something other than what we do is an illusion.
Classical Compatibilism
One solution to the problem that determinism seems to threaten freedom is called compatibilism. Proponents of this idea are called compatibilists, and they argue that there actually is no conflict between free will and determinism. Or in other words, they argue that free will is compatible with determinism.
The crux of their argument is that when we think of choices as being free, we’re not concerned about them being uncaused, but rather unrestricted. In fact, they argue that if we consider true freedom to be uncaused choices, then we have a silly notion of freedom.
After all, we consider our choices to be caused by our character and intentions. If they’re not, then how would all choices not be essentially random and therefore unworthy of judgement?
There are many subgroups of compatibilists. But focusing on classical compatibilists, we can define free actions as actions that are within a person’s ability and are not restricted from them in some way.
Thinking of freedom in this way, we can say that Lebron James is free to dunk a basketball, even though his past makes his dunking inevitable. He is free to do so because he’s able to (clearly), and nothing restricts him from doing so (just ask Paul George!).
Lebron would not be free to dunk a basketball if, for example, he was hypnotized to be so afraid of dunking that he never did it again. Or, if he was locked in a room with no hoop and no ball. The former would hinder his ability; the latter would restrict his access.
Restrictions and Gray Areas
As just mentioned, one restriction on freedom is hypnosis. If a person is hypnotized to not do something, they no longer have the ability to do it. At least, not until they can somehow become unhypnotized.
In his book A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, philosopher Robert Kane says that along with hypnosis, classical compatibilists also include coercion and brainwashing to be constraints on freedom.
We can imagine how coercion prevents freedom. If I’m about to order cheese curds, but then someone pulls a gun on me and says I can either have the cheese curds or my life, I don’t have much of a choice. I could choose cheese curds over my life, but ultimately I’m not a Wisconsin native. As a result, the threat certainly restricts my freedom.
Brainwashing blocks freedom because it essentially blocks deliberation from even happening. A person who is brainwashed doesn’t weigh options and make a choice based on their character and intentions. Instead, they act automatically based on the wishes of who brainwashed them.
These acknowledged constraints by classical compatibilists open the door for questions about possible further constraints.
For example, is manipulation a constraint on freedom? It’s hard to say. The persuasive ability of things like propaganda and pressure to conform certainly seem to sway people towards decisions they wouldn’t have made without them.
Many people have been understandably concerned about the impact of manipulation on freedom. But claiming manipulation to be a constraint on freedom is tricky. The line between manipulation and persuasion can be blurry, and compatibilists aren’t likely to concede that persuasion restricts freedom.
Some (Brief) Objections to Compatibilism
Surprisingly enough, nearly all philosophers agree about compatibilism.
Just kidding. But it was nice to think there was a consensus for a second, right?
Those who disagree with compatibilists are called (unsurprisingly) incompatibilists. Robert Kane’s A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will is an excellent source for understanding these disagreements.
One of these disagreements comes in the form of questioning what it really means to say that a person can do something other than what they do. And it is at this point that philosophers must choose and explain words more carefully than Bill Clinton at his impeachment trial.
Incompatibilists argue that the freedom described by compatibilists is not true freedom. Compatibilists argue that people are free if they can do what they want. But incompatibilists question the idea that the wanting of something itself is free.
Returning to the issue of ordering cheese curds, if my wanting of cheese curds is caused by factors beyond my control, and determinism implies this is the case, then it seems wrong to say that I’m choosing freely. If I can’t choose what I want, how can simply doing what I want make me free?
Another objection to compatibilism calls the truth of determinism into question. The reason is that, because of the unpredictability of quantum mechanics, scientists question determinism nowadays.
This questioning of determinism doesn’t affect compatibilism as much as we may expect. Compatibilists can simply respond by saying that so long as this unpredictability doesn’t stop us from doing what we want, we’re free. But, the possibility of undetermined events does give an opportunity for libertarians (philosophers who deny compatibilism but affirm free will) to come up with some theories involving undetermined events.
The last objection I’ll mention within this section is that the western free will debate relies on a view of time and cause and effect that not all philosophers share. With a different perspective on time or cause and effect, the concept of freedom can look much different.
Implications of the Free Will Debate
The free will debate is, in my opinion, one of the most fascinating topics in philosophy. Part of the reason why is because it questions our assumptions and presents us with interesting thought experiments. But the biggest reason I find the debate so fascinating is because of its implications on how we view morality.
Our assumption that we have free will is the foundation of our praise and blame practices as a society. When someone else does something wrong, we often blame them for it and ridicule them to some extent. And when we mess up, we blame ourselves and feel guilty for our wrongdoing. If free will is an illusion, these praise and blame practices are misguided.
Further, if people do not have free will, our views on criminal justice are also misguided. Currently, it’s common for us to feel that criminals deserve to be punished for their wrongdoing. But if free will is an illusion, such a view is nonsense – the criminal was bound to commit the crime. They don’t deserve punishment any more than a natural disaster deserves punishment.
For this reason, many philosophers who deny free will suggest different approaches to criminal justice. One of them is Derk Pereboom. He suggests in Four Views on Free Will that we should make our justice system rehabilitative rather than retributive. At one point he compares rehabilitating a criminal to treating a person infected with a virus, suggesting that we should remove criminals from society and correct harmful behavior if possible, but not “punish” them.
The Importance of Compatibilist Freedom
Whether we’re swayed by arguments for compatibilism or not, the compatibilist definition of freedom is important. In our daily lives, we care about being able to do what we want. I’ve never heard a philosopher, even one who denies free will, say they don’t care about being able to do what they want.
Even if we deny free will, we care about not being hypnotized. The possibility of having deliberation completely taken away from us is horrifying.
We also care about not being brainwashed. And obviously, we criticize the cults and religions who brainwash their followers and convince them to do harmful things.
Regarding both hypnosis and brainwashing, we despise the manipulative techniques that seem to prevent deliberation in the same way. We’re understandably disturbed by what leaders who use manipulative techniques can convince people to do, putting their followers in a state of obedience indistinguishable from hypnosis.
And obviously, nobody wants to be coerced. Having someone force you to do something against your will is unpleasant and frustrating even when it’s rather insignificant. This is why significant forms of coercion by citizens are illegal and coercion by the government is so frequently opposed.
When we describe an ideal society, free is one of the first words that comes to mind. The freedom we think of in this context is essentially compatibilist. Considering this freedom, we want options for people to choose from, opportunities for them to pursue these options, and protections from coercion, brainwashing, hypnosis, and manipulation.
The claims of classical compatibilism in the free will debate are certainly disputable. But in the context of organizing a free society, they give us a useful conception of freedom. In our efforts to make society more free, we ought to consider the importance of making coercion, brainwashing, hypnosis, and manipulation largely absent while empowering people to do what they want.